I partially agree, partially disagree with you.
For several of the BoR amendments, there is a balancing test: The government clearly has an interest in restricting certain forms of speech (the most extreme example include restrictions on what doctors and lawyers can say as part of their job, or speech that is part of planning a crime being in and of itself punishable as a conspiracy), it has an interest in performing reasonable searches and seizures, and it performs gentle and usual punishment. The mere act of balancing is pretty universal for all individual rights, which have to be balanced against the rights of other individuals to be "safe and secure" (the old: your right to swing your fist ends at my nose, or better a few inches before it), and against the right of the state to both ensure the safety of others, and maintain its monopoly on force. That balancing has caused centuries of fuss about levels of scrutiny. The absolutists among 2A proponents claim that no such test is possible in gun rights, that the 2A must mean "all guns for everyone all the time". And while no Supreme Court case has gone as far as agreeing with those absolutists, Bruen gets interestingly close, by saying that no balancing test can be performed in isolation, it has to only use "history and tradition" laws.
That level of scrutiny is the originalism (a product of Justice Thomas) that is 2A specific. No other right has a similar time-based restriction on how to evaluate it. I suspect that for Justice Thomas, Bruen was the golden opportunity to get the camel's nose of originalism under the tent. And the other conservative justices allowed him to do it, because they didn't care what the justification was, the Sullivan act at issue in Bruen was so onerous, it had to go, using whatever cockamamie reason the old crackpot would come up with. I think the writing in Rahimi shows that the other justices were actually surprised by what Bruen really has done to scrutiny analysis, and didn't like it a bit.
And this is where I see the real complexity of Wolford. The reason Wolford is so dangerous to Bruen is that the state defending the Hawaii vampire rule found a lot of precedent from the late 1700s. If the court were to apply Bruen logically, the vampire rule would have to survive. Yet, that result is abhorrent to the 6 conservatives. So now they have two choices: restrict carry rights, or damage/kill Bruen. Matter-of-fact, I suspect that 3 or 4 of the 6 conservatives would like to kill Bruen anyway, because they are definitely not originalists: they don't want to be bound by historical analysis if it doesn't fit their world view on any particular case. And among liberal constitutional scholars, originalism has never been popular. So one possible outcome of Wolford might be that we see a set of concurrences/dissents that (a) stop the vampire rule and allow carry in private businesses in Hawaii by a 6:3 majority, yet (b) stop the application of Bruen by a 7:2 or 8:1 majority.
And if Bruen dies in the next few months, a lot of "how to fight 2A cases" will have to be yet again re-evaluated, on both sides. And if it dies, there is suddenly much less reason to think about Duncan, which has at its core as one of its questions: how should Bruen even be applied?
Where I completely agree with you: The issues in Duncan would allow the court to reach a very wide-ranging ruling, which could completely change the 2A lay of the land, for better or worse. I'm not sure the court has the appetite at this point in our political situation, as there are other high-stress cases piling up, brought on by the current executive. On the other hand, the court might want to use a big and powerful 2A ruling to improve its credibility and standing with some segment of society, but I can't predict which segment they feel particularly in need to please.