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Bruen specifically says that licensing schemes are constitutional per Kavanaughs concurring opinion, and also states that the 2A is not unlimited and allows regulation which is quoted from Heller. But further, I don't suggest a licensing scheme for pistol gripped semi auto rifles and more robust magazines because I think I need the certification, I suggest it as a potentially palatable compromise that an anti gun legislature could possibly get behind. If the general public had more training, even with more presumably dangerous weapons there would be less negative effect overall. Ive said it a hundred times in the thread, regulation isn't going anywhere but it could certainly be better. I think people misinterpret Bruen by only reading Thomas' opinion but there's also Heller and Kavanaghs' opinion that matter almost more insofar as what states can regulate.
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE
joins, concurring.
The Court employs and elaborates on the text, history,
and tradition test that Heller and McDonald require for
evaluating whether a government regulation infringes on
the Second Amendment right to possess and carry guns for
self-defense. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S.
570 (2008); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742 (2010). Ap-
plying that test, the Court correctly holds that New York’s
outlier “may-issue” licensing regime for carrying handguns
for self-defense violates the Second Amendment.
I join the Court’s opinion, and I write separately to un-
derscore two important points about the limits of the
Court’s decision.
First, the Court’s decision does not prohibit States from
imposing licensing requirements for carrying a handgun for
self-defense. In particular, the Court’s decision does not af-
fect the existing licensing regimes—known as “shall-issue”
regimes—that are employed in 43 States.
The Court’s decision addresses only the unusual discre-
tionary licensing regimes, known as “may-issue” regimes,
that are employed by 6 States including New York. As the
Court explains, New York’s outlier may-issue regime is con-
stitutionally problematic because it grants open-ended dis-
cretion to licensing officials and authorizes licenses only for
those applicants who can show some special need apart
from self-defense. Those features of New York’s regime—
the unchanneled discretion for licensing officials and the
special-need requirement—in effect deny the right to carry
handguns for self-defense to many “ordinary, law-abiding
citizens.” Ante, at 1; see also Heller, 554 U. S., at 635. The
Court has held that “individual self-defense is ‘the central
component’ of the Second Amendment right.” McDonald,
561 U. S., at 767 (quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 599). New
York’s law is inconsistent with the Second Amendment
right to possess and carry handguns for self-defense.
By contrast, 43 States employ objective shall-issue licens-
ing regimes. Those shall-issue regimes may require a li-
cense applicant to undergo fingerprinting, a background
check, a mental health records check, and training in fire-
arms handling and in laws regarding the use of force,
among other possible requirements. Brief for Arizona et al.
as Amici Curiae 7. Unlike New York’s may-issue regime,
those shall-issue regimes do not grant open-ended discre-
tion to licensing officials and do not require a showing of
some special need apart from self-defense. As petitioners
acknowledge, shall-issue licensing regimes are constitu-
tionally permissible, subject of course to an as-applied chal-
lenge if a shall-issue licensing regime does not operate in
that manner in practice. Tr. of Oral Arg. 50−51.
Going forward, therefore, the 43 States that employ ob-
jective shall-issue licensing regimes for carrying handguns
for self-defense may continue to do so. Likewise, the 6
States including New York potentially affected by today’s
decision may continue to require licenses for carrying hand-
guns for self-defense so long as those States employ objec-
tive licensing requirements like those used by the 43 shall-
issue States.
Second, as Heller and McDonald established and the
Court today again explains, the Second Amendment “is nei-
ther a regulatory straightjacket nor a regulatory blank
check.” Ante, at 21. Properly interpreted, the Second
Amendment allows a “variety” of gun regulations. Heller,
554 U. S., at 636. As Justice Scalia wrote in his opinion for
the Court in Heller, and JUSTICE ALITO reiterated in rele-
vant part in the principal opinion in McDonald:
“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second
Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone
through the 19th-century cases, commentators and
courts routinely explained that the right was not a
right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any
manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. . . .
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of fire-
arms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding
the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms. [Footnote 26: We identify these presumptively
lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list
does not purport to be exhaustive.]
“We also recognize another important limitation on
the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we
have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected
were those in common use at the time. We think that
limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition
of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual
weapons.” Heller, 554 U. S., at 626−627, and n. 26 (ci-
tations and quotation marks omitted); see also McDon-
ald, 561 U. S., at 786 (plurality opinion)