Here’s their move:
They say the passcode was obtained in violation of Miranda, therefore the phone wipe produced by entering that passcode must also be suppressed.
Problem: United States v. Patane says an ordinary Miranda violation does not generally require suppression of the physical fruits of an unwarned but voluntary statement. The Supreme Court reiterated that principle in Vega v. Tekoh.
The defense knows this and tries to distinguish Patane by saying the “wiping” is itself testimonial.
I don’t find that very convincing.
There are really two things:
The communication of the passcode: potentially testimonial.
The phone blanking, flashing, restarting, and losing its contents: observable digital/physical evidence of what resulted from entering that credential.
Calling the second thing “testimonial” because it was caused by the first doesn’t magically transform the phone’s resulting state into testimony.
This becomes much stronger for Tunick only if he can show actual unconstitutional compulsion/involuntariness, rather than merely a failure to give Miranda warnings. The motion blurs those concepts. An unwarned voluntary statement and an actually coerced statement have different derivative-evidence consequences.
And there is some hilariously sloppy citation work here. The brief cites:
United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277 “(11th Cir. 1985).”
Lall was decided in 2010.
It also repeatedly cites Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 as 1984. It was decided in 1964.
Those aren’t fatal errors, but they’re not confidence-inspiring in a 13-page federal suppression motion.
- The Fourth Amendment section is where the brief starts looking like an appellate issue-preservation exercise rather than something this district judge can actually grant.
The defense openly acknowledges:
The Eleventh Circuit has held that forensic searches of electronic devices at the border are constitutional without a warrant, probable cause, or individualized suspicion, citing Touset.
Then it basically says Touset is wrong.
That’s fine if you’re preserving the issue for the Eleventh Circuit en banc or Supreme Court. But a federal district judge in Georgia doesn’t get to say, “I prefer the Fourth Circuit.”
Worse, the motion cites Pulido, a published 2025 Eleventh Circuit decision, and then doesn’t grapple honestly with what Pulido actually held.
The brief says:
“As the level of the search’s intrusiveness increases, the amount of suspicion needed to justify the search should increase.”
That gives a badly misleading impression of Eleventh Circuit law as applied to phones.
Pulido expressly says the relevant “intrusiveness” distinction in Eleventh Circuit border doctrine concerns bodily integrity and personal indignity, not the scope of information contained in property. It then reiterates that even a forensic electronic-device search requires no individualized suspicion.
That’s about as direct as precedent gets.
- Even worse for Tunick, Pulido already rejected almost his exact “contraband” argument.
Tunick argues that the border exception historically exists to stop contraband from entering the United States and asks, essentially:
If the digital contents were destroyed, where was the danger of contraband entering the country?
Then he argues authorities improperly used the border to investigate domestic Cop City-related activity.
But Pulido considered the argument that searching private messages exceeds the historical contraband rationale and rejected it.
The Eleventh Circuit said Vergara and Touset do not restrict the border-search exception to searches for contraband.
Meaning the defense isn’t merely asking the district court to extend the law a little. It’s asking the district court to go against the published Eleventh Circuit case it cites two pages earlier.
- And the omission of United States v. Quarles is pretty brutal.
This may be the most interesting thing I found.
Quarles was decided by the Eleventh Circuit in May 2025, about ten months before Tunick filed this motion. It’s unpublished, so it isn’t binding precedent like Pulido, but its facts are almost comically relevant.
CGIS was already investigating Quarles for domestic criminal activity. It put an alert in a law-enforcement database and specifically requested that his electronic devices be searched when he returned to the United States. When he returned from an international cruise, CBP, CGIS, and HSI intercepted him, took the phone, manually searched it, and then performed a bit-for-bit forensic extraction.
Sound familiar?
Quarles argued that the border exception should apply only to contraband searches and that using it to gather evidence of ordinary criminal activity required a warrant.
The Eleventh Circuit said his argument was foreclosed by Pulido.
That doesn’t make Quarles identical to Tunick. Quarles had considerably stronger individualized suspicion against him. But the appellate court’s legal reasoning did not depend on suspicion being necessary. More importantly, it demonstrates that a preplanned request from another investigative agency to exploit a suspect’s return through the border does not, by itself, take the resulting device search outside Eleventh Circuit border-search doctrine.
Tunick’s motion never mentions Quarles.
That’s a conspicuous omission.
- The out-of-circuit cases are real, but they don’t rescue him in Georgia.
The defense cites Aigbekaen and Kolsuz from the Fourth Circuit, Qin from the First, and Cano from the Ninth to demonstrate that other circuits impose tighter limits on electronic border searches.
That’s legitimate appellate advocacy. There genuinely is disagreement among the circuits.
But it doesn’t make those cases controlling in the Northern District of Georgia. Pulido is published Eleventh Circuit precedent. A district court is bound by it.
So that whole final section reads to me primarily as:
“We know existing circuit law is against us; we’re preserving this issue for appeal.”
That’s perfectly normal defense lawyering, but it’s a very different thing from the Reddit/forum interpretation that Tunick has discovered some giant hole in CBP’s border-search authority.
There are also two arguments I think the defense strangely underdevelops.
First, Pulido says border-search analysis begins by asking whether there was statutory authority for the search before reaching Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Tunick’s lawyers mention this and then barely develop it. If their theory really is “CBP was being used as an FBI proxy for an investigation totally outside legitimate border functions,” attacking the precise statutory authority and its scope would seem much more useful than telling a district judge that binding Touset is wrongly decided.
Second, the motion says DHS seized his devices for 30 days, yet it doesn’t really develop a separate prolonged-seizure argument. Eleventh Circuit law recognizes that even an initially lawful seizure can become unreasonable through excessive delay. Quarles itself analyzes that question separately. Whether 30 days was unreasonable would depend heavily on what the government did during that period, but that’s at least a doctrinally available argument rather than asking the district court to ignore Pulido.
The really important point for the §2232 charge is this:
Tunick can win a Miranda issue without necessarily proving that CBP lacked lawful authority to take the phone.